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SILENCED: WOMEN & EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 
This article examines the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and its judgments 
associated with women’s rights in the areas of reproduction, religious, and refugee expression. 
As an international court, the ECtHR seeks to resolve disputes related to violations of human 
rights between an individual and a member state. Although the introduction of the court has been 
perceived as progressive for global human rights, the ECtHR’s recent judicial recommendations 
indicate an absence of recognition or limited advocacy for women’s rights. In addition to 
analyzing how women’s reproduction, refugee, and religious expression rights have received 
inadequate support from the ECtHR, this article will also suggest five possible influences 
underlying the court’s decisions: namely, the ECtHR’s definition of rights as exclusive of 
women-specific liberties; hesitancy to override national sovereignty; the minority of female 
judges serving on the ECtHR’s Strasbourg bench; the court’s consideration of external 
conservative bodies such as the Catholic church; and finally, that the international court, which 
relies on member states’ cooperation, is susceptible to politicization and the rising far right. This 
article concludes with policy recommendations for the ECtHR, describing how the court might 
be able to move forward with increasing women’s representation inside the courtroom and 
formulating gender-sensitive case law. By pursuing a more progressive and inclusive mission, 
the court will likely benefit from increased international legitimacy while re-establishing itself as 
a distinguished defender of women’s basic liberties in Europe.  
Keywords: Women’s rights, European Court of Human Rights, judicial politicization, 
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Women’s voices within the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are heard from both sides 
of the Strasbourg bench; however, whether the court adequately recognizes and advocates for 
women’s rights continues to present concern for scholars across diverse disciplines. In a 
significant number of women-related cases, the ECtHR has given judicial recommendations 
which have implicitly condoned rights infringements by European member states, or which 
explicitly distanced the court from being a defender of certain reproductive, religious, and 
refugee liberties which other international organizations would consider fundamental. Whether 
rejecting abortion access under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights in A, B 
and C v. Ireland (2010) or legally endorsing Belgium’s ban on face veils (Kalantry, Pradhan 
2017), a corpus of the ECtHR’s case law demonstrates a judicial direction that is remarkably 
conservative regarding key opportunities to expand women’s rights. Considering Europe’s recent 
refugee crisis and emerging knowledge of violations and violence against refugee women held in 
European detention centers (Nobel Women's Initiative, 2016), it is increasingly relevant to 
question how women’s rights are represented, interpreted, and recognized by international 
courts. This article will analyze the ECtHR and its judgments regarding reproductive, refugee, 
and religious rights, and will demonstrate that this human rights institution has undermined 
women in these three areas. 
Because international courts such as the ECtHR are relatively recent and evolving 
organizations, established within the last century to address mass violations of human rights and 
other issues post-world wars, this article will contribute to the emerging literature in the field. 
The dearth of available data means only speculative suggestions can be offered for understanding 
five possible influences that prevent women’s rights from manifesting more visibly within the 
ECtHR: the court’s definition of rights as exclusive of women-specific liberties; hesitancy to 
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override national sovereignty; the minority of female judges serving on the ECtHR’s Strasbourg 
bench; the court’s consideration of external conservative bodies such as the Catholic church; and 
finally, that the court, which relies on member states’ cooperation, is susceptible to politicization 
and the rising far right. 
 This article concludes with policy recommendations for the ECtHR, describing how the 
court might be able to move forward with increasing women’s representation inside the 
courtroom and formulating gender-sensitive case law. By pursuing a more progressive and 
inclusive mission, the court will likely benefit from increased international legitimacy while re-
establishing itself as a distinguished defender of women’s basic liberties in Europe.  
Background on the European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was initially established in 1959 to 
address civil and political rights infringements, corresponding to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Located in Strasbourg, France with the involvement of 47 European member 
states, it may hear applications from an individual, a member state, or multiple parties. 
(European Court of Human Rights, 2018). The court relies on the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which was signed in Rome in 1950. According to the ECtHR, “judgments 
finding violations [of the Convention] are binding on the States concerned and they are obliged 
to execute them” (European Court of Human Rights, 2014). If finding a violation, these 
judgments (often referred to as recommendations because of a lack of external mechanisms to 
enforce compliance with the court’s rulings) involve compensation of the victimized individual 
and the corresponding member state’s implementation of national reform to prevent additional 
violations (Hervey, 2017). The ECtHR is highly influential as one of the first international 
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courts, and it is the only such institution which will allow individuals, rather than states, to 
directly bring cases.  
The often-controversial Article 8 is frequently cited by women plaintiffs at the court who 
seek to terminate a pregnancy, wear a veil in public, or gain custody of their refugee children: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home  
and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right  
except such as it is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic  
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the  
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of rights and freedoms 
of others. (Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights, 2010) 
Despite the Convention’s broad scope and masculine-pronoun language, similar human 
rights groups in Europe are remarkably more inclusionary about promoting women’s rights; for 
instance, they champion women’s ability to participate in public political office or be employed 
without facing gender-based harassment (Council of Europe, 2018). This article will only focus 
on the intersection of women and reproductive, religious, and refugee rights, which have been 
threatened by multiple socio-political factors in recent years. These socio-political factors in 
Europe include the rise of stricter abortion laws (Matchar, 2013), increased Islamophobia, which 
particularly impacts women who are easily identified for discrimination when wearing traditional 
religious clothing (Henley, 2017), and the recent influx of migrants from war-ravaged countries 
such as Syria—a number of whom are vulnerable refugee women encountering various dangers 
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along the journey, including assault and mistreatment from male migrants and state actors 
(Müller et al., 2017).  
Methodology 
Quantitative research has measured the number and frequency of women serving 
judgeships on the Strasbourg bench, demonstrating that the court has faced multiple challenges 
soliciting female candidates from member states, and additionally struggles with consistent 
number underrepresentation of this minority overall. Utilizing such data enables this research to 
echo concerns that the internal structure of the ECtHR does not correspond with its stated goals 
of gender equality. Additionally, with women underrepresented in the decision-making process, 
one must look closer at the defining characteristics of the women who do ascend the bench. 
Qualitative analysis regarding their curriculum vitaes and legal experience, merged with the 
quantitative method, form a compelling illumination of which women in particular are promoted 
to ascend an international court, and how many women eventually join a court that claims to 
support gender equality. 
Literature Review: ECtHR Judicial Recommendations 
A majority of literature on women’s rights seems to reach consensus that the ECtHR has 
not been a strong advocate in certain landmark cases. Firstly, limited reproductive freedom and 
the rejected right of a woman to seek the termination of a pregnancy through abortion has 
concerned many scholars. In 19 highly influential ECtHR cases such as Tysiac v. Poland (2007), 
and A, B and C v. Ireland (2010, reproductive rights for women have been critically 
marginalized (Oja, Yamin, 2016). Conversely, certain legal scholars with a feminist background, 
such as Rachel Cichowski—assert that the ECtHR continues to pioneer further protections for 
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women, especially by denouncing rape, sexual trafficking, and other reproductive-related matters 
(Cichowski, 2016, p. 913).  
Secondly, analysis on women’s right to religious expression led by scholar Elkayam-
Levy, claims that by lending credibility to member states who wish to restrict and define 
women's dress, the ECtHR fails to adequately intervene on behalf of “women’s rights, religious 
freedoms, and equality” (Elkayam-Levy, 2014, p. 1222). Using the work of Camila Arêas on 
strategies of religious visibility, this article will also exmaine why France—geopolitically home 
to European Court of Human Rights and a highly diverse population—has pitted secular 
democracy against an individual’s religious attire.  
The final women's rights issue this article is concerned with—the recent situation of 
refugee women arriving in Europe and receiving maltreatment from fellow refugees, camp 
administrators, and government entities—is constricted by the dearth of peer-reviewed scholarly 
resources; the peak of migration influx has been within the past several years at the time of 
writing. Nonetheless, the violence suffered by refugee women has not escaped the notice of 
numerous headlines and human rights organizations (both governmental and non-governmental), 
which serve as a starting point for further inquiry into how the ECtHR has resolved dilemmas 
involving refugees.  
Finally, literature on the European Court of Human Rights as an institution has focused 
on the internal structure using positive analysis (for instance, which legal mechanisms are 
currently in place? How many judges are on the bench and is there partiality?) rather than a deep 
normative analysis (such as how the ECtHR could enforce decisions on member states more 
effectively, or by which criteria international judges should be chosen). Drawing primarily from 
court opinions, but also from a body of theories such as judicial politicization, this article will 
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attempt to offer five hypotheses on why women's rights seem to have been undermined by the 
ECtHR judiciary. 
An Analysis of ECtHR Decisions on Women’s Rights 
ECtHR’s recent judicial recommendations indicate an absence of recognition or limited 
advocacy for women’s rights. Although not comprehensive of all judicial decisions, the cases 
discussed here regarding women who seek reproductive, religious, or refugee-related rights from 
the ECtHR illuminate how the international court interprets the European Convention on Human 
Rights without strongly advocating for women.  
Beginning with reproductive freedom and particularly abortion, women have been 
critically marginalized in 19 highly influential ECtHR cases, specifically Tysiac v. Poland (2007) 
and A, B, and C v. Ireland (2010) where the court explicitly distanced themselves from abortion. 
Tysiac v. Poland (2007) concerns Ms. Tysiac’s inability to access a lawful abortion; as a woman 
in Poland, she was informed by multiple physicians that her third pregnancy posed a serious risk 
to her eyesight. In Warsaw, she sought a state hospital for the procedure; however, the institution 
refused to accept former or current medical assessments that would support terminating the 
pregnancy. Soon after a caesarean section, social welfare confirmed that Ms. Tysiac’s eyesight 
now had almost completely deteriorated, and she lodged a complaint with the ECtHR for the 
Polish state denying a medical procedure she requested at the advice of other doctors. Although 
the court found in favor of Ms. Tysiac’s right to private life as described under Article 8 ECHR, 
it also significantly distanced itself from reproductive rights--an area which disproportionately 
affects not only women’s bodies, but also their life trajectories should they be a caretaker (or 
often, the primary caretaker, as Ms. Tysiac was) of children. In a separate opinion, Judge Bonello 
spelled out an explicit rejection of women’s reproductive rights by stating that the ECtHR could 
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not consider “any abstract right to abortion” or “any fundamental human right to abortion” 
(Tysiac v. Poland Judgment, 2007, p. 37).  
Similarly, the case A, B, and C v. Ireland (2010) all involve Irish women who assert that 
their pregnancies were unintentional, due to (unexpectedly) fertile partners and ineffective Plan 
B pills. Due to a lack of information for the procedure and social stigma in their own country, the 
women arranged for abortions in England. Each suffered a number of health impacts, such as 
nausea and bleeding, weeks afterwards due to poorly performed procedures. Yet the Court 
insisted once again that “Article 8 cannot…be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion” and 
dismissed all complaints except for the plea of C, the petitioner whose ongoing chemotherapy 
was in fatal conflict with the ability to bear and raise children. Even while raising contention 
with Article 8, the court had agreed that in Ms. Tysiac’s case, the Polish state needed to provide 
access for her medical abortion; just three years later, they conservatively shied away from even 
supporting plaintiffs A and B; while it is difficult to suggest a reason why, it is evident that an 
initially conservative stance became more extreme and led to the dismissal of cases in 2010. 
Do women’s rights include the ability to enjoy reproductive freedom, and indeed, have 
access to safe continuation or termination of a pregnancy? It is certainly championed by the 
United Nations and other international organizations on a global scale, and by individual scholars 
such as Tatyana Margolin, who argues that “in order for states to take their responsibilities to 
women seriously, it is essential to establish a free-standing right to abortion” (Margolin, 2007, p. 
78). Yet the ECtHR continues business as usual with “deferred abortion-related cases to states 
that are hostile to women’s right to an abortion” and is complicit in “tolerating the 
criminalization of medical procedures that only women need” (Margolin, 2007, p. 78). What 
does it mean that the court governs based on Article 8—a right to privacy and family life—yet 
SILENCED: WOMEN & EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 11 
rejects a woman’s autonomy over her own body and ability to have children? While this article 
would propose that it is a lack of feminist orientation within the court that has translated to a 
failure to incorporate women’s reproductive rights, particularly access to abortion, into their case 
law, other scholars claim that the court has nonetheless been progressive regarding women’s 
bodily integrity.  
The ECtHR stands as a model for international courts and holds significant sway in the 
global conversation about human rights. Yet the Strasbourg bench refuses to recognize abortion 
as a human rights issue through their judicial recommendations within Tysiac v. Poland (2007) 
and A, B, and C v. Ireland (2010); as Margolin noted, they simply leave women’s reproductive 
health in the hands of member states (Poland, Ireland, and others) despite evidence that these 
countries have consistently failed to make women’s health needs (supported by doctors) a 
priority over the existence of a fetus. Particularly by separating Tysiac and A, B and C from 
institutional human rights abuses and using the Article 8 injunction of privacy as a reason for the 
court to practice non-interference, the ECtHR has tacitly allowed member states to block 
abortions while also hindering human rights in a significant away. Scholars such as Oja, Yamin, 
and Charlotte Bunch critically draw our attention to these recent abortion cases, but the often-
controversial topic of abortion set aside, Oja and Yamin also explain the inherent dangers of the 
court’s stated intention in A, B, and C v. Ireland (2010) to address “public” institutional abuses 
and remain aloof from private moral issues, especially when concerning women or reproductive 
rights. This trend, according to Oja and Yamin, creates intimidating difficulties for women who 
need to seek help for what the court might consider a “private” moral issue, such as violence by 
an intimate partner or a state actor infringing on a woman’s body. (Oja, Yamin, 2016, p. 76). 
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In support of the converse view that the court has actually been progressive for women’s 
bodily integrity, we can also understand that how ECtHR is structually constrained in its impact; 
according to a French scholar authoring a comprehensive book on the workings of the ECtHR, 
En revanche, dans son role de contrôleur de la consitutionnalité des lois, le Conseil 
s’est a priori interdit l’accès à la jurisprudence européenne en décidant, le 15 janvier  
1975, que la CEDH (dont l’article 2 & 1, aurait pu, selon certains, empêcher la  
libéralisation de l’avortement) ne fait pas partie du bloc de constitionnalité et que, 
d’une manière plus générale, il ne lui appartient pas de contrôler la conventionnalité 
des lois (Marguénand, 2016). 
Translated, the paragraph specifies, “On the other hand, in its role of controlling the 
constitutionality of laws, the council has a priori prohibited access to European case law by 
deciding, on January 15, that the CEDH (which could have, according to some, prevented the 
liberalization of abortion) is not part of the constitutional block and that, more generally, it does 
not belong to it to control the legality of the laws” (Marguénaud, 2016). Because the 47 states 
involved with the ECtHR represent a great diversity of population, laws, and moral identities, 
each time the ECtHR accepts a plaintiff’s complaint and ultimately challenges a member state is 
an instance of introducing new and overarching case law, meaning that the bench could be seen 
as simply cautious rather than conservative.  
Does the court fare more progressively regarding religious expression? Recent debates 
over headscarves and other “modest” attire of Muslim women (largely due to headlines about 
veil banning) range from supportive to critical; feminist theorists often add an intersecting layer 
to an already complex issue of regarding the manifestation of religious beliefs, political tensions 
in an era of jihadist terror, and immigration integration in Europe. Most recently, in Dakir v. 
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Belgium (2017) and Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium (2017), the plaintiffs had been fined for 
wearing full face veils in public areas, but the ECtHR legally upheld Belgium’s ban on face veils 
due to concerns about “public safety, gender equality and a certain conception of “living 
together” in society (Strasbourg Observer, 2017). 
Some scholars remarked that the court’s refusal to clash over the ban signals a respectful 
recognition of member sovereignty and alignment with the often-secular focus of human rights 
in European democracies; however, others decried a violation to women’s freedom to observe 
religious dress and wear garments that make them feel comfortable participating in employment 
and education (Elkayam-Levy, 2014, p. 1176). Elkayam-Levy herself contends that secularism 
must be recognized as a human rights value in itself while freedom to religious practice is 
considered within, rather than regarded as external to, the court’s jurisdiction: by leaving it up to 
member states, the ECtHR fails to make an adequate intervention for “women’s rights, religious 
freedoms, and equality” (Elkayam-Levy, 2014, p. 1222). 
 But why might secular democracies attempt to restrict women’s choice of dress in 
public? Camila Arêas, a researcher at Université Paris, analyzes French media narratives 
regarding a woman fined for wearing the hijab while driving, despite the fact that she was not 
involved in any accidents. Arêas realized that the visibility of Muslim women who wear the veil 
for modesty is often literally sidelined—even in in journal headlines—in favor of publishing 
state declarations on security dangers associated with Islamic dress or the paragraphs and photo 
flashes focus on a male spokesperson; in this scenario, it was the husband of the woman wearing 
the hijab. Such media representation might be stoking fears of jihadism and state security, while 
simultaneously otherizing Muslim women’s modesty and moral standards. Arêas’ article broadly 
suggests that the French Republic perceives the burqa as an anti-thesis of values such as laïcité, 
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or separation of church and state (Arêas, 2015), thus providing one explanation for why women 
fighting for religious expression at the ECtHR are viewed as oppositional to secular democracies 
even though they are only attempting to claim the right to dress as they wish (Kalantry, Pradhan 
2017). The court, however, ultimately has the moral responsibility uphold human rights in all 
contexts (secular, religious, or both) rather than endorse Islamophobic national laws that limit 
women’s religious expression within a public space simply because her dress might be 
associated with a public security concern such as jihadism. 
The article’s final women’s rights issue concerns the recent situation of women as 
refugees in Europe. Claiming that Europe has long considered itself enlightened by continuously 
expanding rights for “women or LGBT people,” Thomas Spijkerboer conjectures that in many 
cases, these same people are “required to renounce human rights in order to prevent persecution, 
for example by complying with patriarchal family norms” (Spijkerboer, 2017, p. 222). Even the 
Council of Europe expounded upon the dangers for women mentioned by Spijkerboer and called 
on related European international organizations to better monitor and support women refugees, 
who number almost 60% of those who cross into Europe via life-threatening land and sea routes 
(Council of Europe, 2016). Detention of refugee women with inadequate resources (especially in 
cases of pregnancy), lack of protection from male migrants and police brutality, and uncertain 
legal status mean that Greece and Italy, in addition to other countries, have violated human rights 
(Council of Europe, 2016). Refugees’ forced “renounce[ment] of human rights,” as Spijkerboer 
claims, is a view heralded by other scholars—most clearly by Dembour in an Oxford University 
Press book on “When Humans Become Migrants: Study of the European Court of Human Rights 
with an Inter-American counterpoint.” Dembour suggests, “From a human rights perspective, it 
would be normal to consider the human being before anything else…in the Strasbourg case law, 
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however, it is the right of the state” (Dembour, 2015, p. 119). In numerous decisions, Dembour 
claims that the “Strasbourg court has no qualms about rejecting complaints which are about ‘the 
right to have rights’ or at least a legal status by migrants (Dembour, 2015, p. 443). For instance, 
the Council of Europe noted that refugee women face inadequate resources in detention centers 
when expecting a child. Dembour goes a step further with case analysis, citing Moser v. Austria 
(2006) where (as in the abortion cases mentioned previously) a mother invoked Article 8 (the 
right to private and family life) in trying to claim custody of her child; although the court 
eventually granted a modest compensation, their ruling sought to portray the circumstances of a 
refugee family separation as unusual, despite the fact that there are additional cases where 
refugee mothers, already facing difficulties acquiring permits to live and work in their host 
country, found themselves physically separated by a state hospital or other actor from living 
with, or caring for, their child (Dembour, 2015, p. 269). Regarding conditions in refugee camps 
and reported maltreatment from state actors, the ECtHR does not yet seem to have specific cases; 
however, considering their past record, it will be critical to continue recognizing the difficulties 
faced by refugee women and especially by refugee mothers who seek reunion with their children. 
       On the other hand, some legal scholars—particularly Rachel Cichowski—assert that the 
ECtHR continues to expand the protections for women. Drawing on recent official databases of 
the ECtHR, Cichowski, Chrun, and other colleagues discovered that amicus curiae (advocacy) 
groups had greatly influenced decisions around women’s rights (Cichowski, 2016, p. 892). 
According to Cichowksi, they have “expanded the protections provided to women under Article 
3, 8, and 14 of the European Convention” (2016, p. 892). In particular, these amendments 
specifically outlawed violence such as rape, sex trafficking, and other reproductive-related 
matters (Cichowski, 2016, p. 913). There is therefore scholarly debate about the extent to which 
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external groups have influenced the court’s decisions, and in which direction: toward more 
concrete protections associated with European Convention Articles, or towards disturbingly 
vague “private” spaces outside the judicial jurisdiction, where member states or individual actors 
are ostensibly unable to be brought into a court of human rights? This article has found that 
women’s rights are at risk, but what factors may be influential regarding the court’s continued 
lack of support? 
An Analysis: Potential Factors Influencing the Interpretation of Women’s Rights 
This section will identify five potential factors which may be influential to the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of women’s rights: ECtHR judges' definition of rights as exclusionary of women-
specific liberties; judges' hesitancy to override national sovereignty when confronted with more 
patriarchal member states; the lack of female judges serving on the Strasbourg bench; the court's 
consideration of external conservative bodies such as the Catholic church; and finally, the chance 
that the international court, which relies on member states' cooperation, is susceptible to 
politicization. All proposed factors will be explored in less or greater detail. 
The first factor, ECtHR judges’ definition of rights, has already been discussed in the two 
reproductive cases where the right to private life, Article 8 ECtHR, was found to not guarantee 
the right to an abortion, and similarly, made a motion for separating public and private matters. 
In such examples, the court clearly pursues human rights rhetoric while neglecting to use the 
term “women’s rights” or allude to gender-specific rights. In such a case, Judge Bonello and the 
other representatives of the chamber continue a more conservative dialogue which invites 
member states to make their own rules, even when a woman’s health is immediately threatened 
by an unwanted pregnancy. There is significant possibility that judges simply observe a less 
gendered and more secular version of human rights in the Convention, for instance leading to a 
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defense of the headscarf ban due to valuing the right of secularism more, which has unfortunate 
consequences for women who seek reproductive freedoms. 
Another potential constriction for ECtHR judges may derive from the need for 
cooperation from member states. Throughout Europe’s history, societies have primarily been 
patriarchal in nature, placing men at the forefront of possession of goods, moral authority, and 
political leadership. Changing such institutional norms requires popular support and a 
willingness to embrace gender equality. When the ECtHR faces a division between national 
sovereignty and an individual complaint, particularly when it concerns women fighting to 
dismantle a patriarchal norm describing when to have children, which garments are appropriate, 
and how to live in a refugee camp, it is highly likely the ECtHR judges face some influence to 
protect national sovereignty where possible to continue ensuring cooperation from the member 
states. 
A third, and highly analyzed, reason for the lack of support for women’s rights suggests 
that women are underrepresented on the Strasbourg bench and so provide limited input on 
gender-specific issues. The judicial body of international courts has long been closely 
scrutinized, often in regards to political factors but also for aspects such as diversity. As a role 
model for accountability, transparency, international cooperation, and legal innovation, 
international courts receive considerable scholarly attention, and the ECtHR--which publicly 
states that promotion of women and gender equality is a cornerstone goal of their collective 
work--has recently faced critique for its limited inclusion of women. Stéphanie Vauchez, a 
professor of law at Université Paris Ouest Nanterre, provides a clarifying and extensive report in 
her 2015 article, “More Women—But Which Women? The Rule and the Politics of Gender 
Balance at the European Court of Human Rights.” In her original quantitative and qualitative 
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research, she analyses the European legislation regarding diversity in ECtHR judgeships and 
deconstructs women candidates’ curriculum vitaes from 1959—2012 to discover if—and to what 
extent—member states make a gender-based distinction when placing forward male and female 
candidates for judgeship selection. She notes that the court’s external appointing committee, the 
PACE mechanism, has been proactive by approving the resolution 1366 in 2004 which requires 
“at least one candidate of each sex” in order to consider a country’s recommended judges 
(Vauchez, 2015, p 201). Nonetheless, Vauchez joins a host of other scholars (Thornton, 2007; 
Madsen 2007) who express concern that gender equality remains far from affirmative. As 
Vauchez points out, four countries have since polarized the gender issue by refusing to comply 
with resolution 1366 and presenting all-male lists: the Slovak Republic, Malta, Belgium, and 
most recently Moldova in 2012 (Vauchez, 2015, p. 211). Despite the 18 women currently sitting 
as Strasbourg judges, Vauchez’s long-term analysis of the female candidates’ CVs suggest that 
future inclusion of more women may continue to present difficulties to a gender-balanced 
ECtHR. 
As Vauchez argues, a concerning number of the women recommended by member states 
lack much of the involvement and qualifications held by their male candidates counterparts for 
international judicial appointments; for instance, in some cases they have not served in their 
country’s national supreme courts (Vauchez, 2015, p. 219). Thus, though they are presented on 
the candidate list to outwardly comply with the groundbreaking 2004 resolution 1366 at least one 
woman candidate, these female lawyers and judges are set up to serve as placating alternatives 
rather than significant competition. Indeed, in such instances, Vauchez suggests that member 
states are overtly “complying with the rule of gender balance while simultaneously remaining 
confident that eventually a man will be elected” (Vauchez, 2015, p. 216). 
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This trend is particularly troubling because it is not only numerically evident that women 
are underrepresented, but also because of the implications of a male-dominated bench attempting 
to address gender-specific issues such as violence against women. As Vauchez suggests, 
effective gender-sensitive case law may be one benefit of having more female judges (Vauchez, 
2015, p. 199). While direct links have not been established between gender-sensitive case law 
and the gender of judges, it is apparent that becoming more inclusive of women within the 
ECtHR’s internal structure would place it on the same standard as other international 
organizations who also focus on upholding gender equality: “Famously, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) was created as a gender-balanced court...ever since its installation in 2003 
half of the judges of the ICC have indeed been women” (Vauchez, 2015, p. 198). 
 
       Fig. 1. “Eagerness to Present Women Candidates” before and after resolution 1366. 
Image credit: Vauchez, 2015. 
Additionally, we should not assume that because of resolution 1366 requiring at least one 
woman present on candidate lists from member states, the support for women has substantially 
increased. In fact, it has stayed constant to some extent even among historically eager countries 
which anticipated the need for female candidates ahead of the PACE appointing mechanism 
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(such as Macedonia, which approved just 2 women for consideration each time it submitted lists 
within six years preceding and after resolution 1366. Rather than the numbers of women 
candidates increasing, Vauchez’s original data (some of which is captured in Fig. 1) only serve 
to exemplify how that number has largely failed to grow. It is not only concerning that four 
member states have openly challenged the ECtHR resolution; it is also concerning that amongst 
allied countries, female candidates are rarely given a spot on the ballot. 
But, if the men elected to the Strasbourg bench are well-qualified judicial candidates, and 
hold reasonably progressive views on human rights, then what else could be undermining 
women’s rights? Perhaps it is the external bodies which provide informal advice to the ECtHR. 
Drawing on recent official databases of the ECtHR, Cichowski, Chrun, and other colleagues 
discovered that amicus curiae (advocacy) groups had greatly influenced decisions around 
women’s rights (Cichowski, 2016, p. 892). Unlike Oja and Yamin’s findings (some of which 
indicated that moral positions of the Catholic church, among other authorities, tended to be 
regarded more favorably than women petitioners’ concerns), Cichowski’s analysis of the official 
ECtHR dataset argues that in the long term, the court has practiced inclusive decision-making by 
allowing input “from human rights organizations to professional associations” and ultimately 
The ways that advocacy groups impact the court’s rulings are the subject of further research, but 
it is very likely a component. 
This article proposes a final reason: that the international court, which is composed of 
member states and actively creating its own precedent, may be susceptible to politicization. 
Hirschl explains how “the reliance on courts and judges for dealing with what we might call 
“mega-politics”: core political controversies that define (and often divide) whole polities” 
(Hirscl, 2009, p. xlviii). A case can certainly be made that Europe, which has recently seen the 
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rise of populist Far Right parties with ideologies hostile to immigrants and women’s rights and 
secured increased in parliamentary elections in Sweden and presidential candidates in France 
(Bremmer, 2015), is relying on international courts—such as the ECtHR—to deal with core 
political controversies around abortion, refugee rights, and the manifestation of one’s religion. 
Consequently, the court’s seeming conservatism may be influenced by the rising far-right 
political sentiments of the past decade. Should European societies become ever-more 
conservative under the charismatic state leaders, this article suggests that the court should 
nonetheless continue to maintain a progressive human rights front and to extremely specific in 
revisiting women’s rights cases and deciding to take jurisdiction in these areas to cement human 
rights that are gender-inclusive. 
Limitations of Research 
In this secondary research, which relies on interdisciplinary interpretations of the 
ECtHR’s internal organizing structure and judicial recommendations, it is critical to be 
comprehensive to avoid unintentional bias and selective case studies that would misrepresent the 
breadth of the court’s work on gender equality. By reviewing scholarship that documents how 
the Strasbourg bench has promoted landmark progressive policies, it is hoped that the 
international court gains due credit as a unique institution that has pioneered many 
unprecedented efforts for gender equality, such as the 2004 Resolution 1366 that began requiring 
at least one female candidate for judgeship from each member state. The findings of this thesis, 
that women’s rights remain often overlooked by the court, have been made on a selection of 
evidence from particular cases chosen for their landmark nature. Unfortunately, the research time 
parameters mean that it is not feasible to read or examine the entire body of judicial 
recommendations related to women’s rights, meaning that a greater context will be elusive and 
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cases chosen to reverberate through the scholarly work will likely be those which put the court in 
the most unfortunate light. Furthermore, the research is secondary, meaning that it relies on 
scholars and not on direct interviews or other qualitative data which may provide a closer look at 
whether women felt their cases were adequately addressed. Coming primarily from legal 
feminist scholars, they may well have a very different opinion than the women concerned. 
Finally, this research relies on the few available sources for understanding the internal structure 
of the ECtHR; it sparks a conversation about the inclusion of female decision-makers meant to 
be continued rather than providing a strong evaluation on how it has become this way. 
Intention of Research 
The intention of this research was to examine women’s rights in the context of judicial 
recommendations and internal structure of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which 
is one the of the longest-established and venerable institutions established for human rights and 
therefore arguably could be at the forefront of many novel human rights developments. 
However, upon discovery of different scholarly viewpoints that purported the court’s lack of 
impact for women’s rights, the research focus changed to scouring secondary sources from 
multidisciplinary viewpoints (such as reports from human rights groups; analysis from feminist 
legal scholars; and even published commentary by European Union colleague organisations). 
This allowed a more diverse and varied understanding of an institution that has not yet been in 
operation long, nor has been externally documented regarding its decision-making. Drawing on 
interdisciplinary sources, as scholars have said, raises the implication that findings are more 
accurate having resonated with various academic audiences. 
 
Concluding Thoughts and Future Research 
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       Women’s rights, which can be said to enclose all dimensions of presenting as female and 
participating equally in society, have increasingly become headline material as controversies on 
reproductive rights including birth control continue, tense political situations make uprooted 
refugee women vulnerable to state and individual agents, and religious expression becomes 
compromised in apparent favor of an anonymous democratic secularism. With such complex 
issues arising in cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights, which aims to 
uphold basic human freedoms internationally and impartially, it is evident that the often 
progressive and pioneering court has rarely responded in a way that satisfies scholarly critics, 
and this article has demonstrated that the ECtHR’s recent judicial recommendations indicate an 
absence of recognition or limited advocacy for women’s rights. 
In order to draw an accurate and compelling picture of the gendered situation playing out 
inside the walls of the ECtHR’s Strasbourg court and reverberating throughout its most 
influential case recommendations, this research utilized qualitative and quantitative methods of 
how women were selected to the international bench and the remarkable challenges they faced, 
despite historic women’s rights promotions such as resolution 1366. Beyond the documented and 
consistent gender bias involving judge selection for the ECtHR, there was also a concerning 
trend in contemporary cases where the ECtHR has neglected to distinctly advocate for women’s 
rights, declaring instead that such matters are private affairs or even deferring to a member state 
or external organization which has crusaded for subjugation of women (for example, state 
control over women’s dress in claims to minimize terrorism and ostensibly promote secular and 
democratic values—which seems a slight oxymoron as dress often has as much to do with 
cultural custom as it does religious values, and democracy necessarily implies a representative 
government). In the three areas of women’s rights that were examined—reproductive, refugee, 
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and religious freedoms—evidence in the form of oral commentaries from judges, as well as case 
recommendations, indicate that the ECtHR must re-evaluate how it genuinely engages with the 
progressive values that the institution professes to uphold. 
      Future research may focus more specifically on the extent to which women’s rights are 
upheld in the thousands of cases overseen by the ECtHR, because it is critical to understand 
whether women have consistently been disadvantaged in judicial rulings or if they have in fact 
helped establish progressive precedent, and by which mechanisms (such as a lack of member 
state accountability, or perhaps ECtHR statements on gender equality). 
Is it possible for the court to restore, or at best maintain, its international relevance and 
legitimacy while expanding their focus on women’s rights? As a vast institution relying on 
individual countries to submit judicial candidates and member states to ultimately implement 
case recommendations, the ECtHR is continually constrained by lack of full accountability and 
left to navigate a minefield of international political tensions as they chart new human rights 
territory in case precedent. Considering all of this, it can be understandable that the ECtHR has 
attempted to forge a conservative and relatively non-confrontational approach (for example, by 
declaring birth control a private affair, not a state one despite all odds, and minimizing its 
connection to women’s rights). However, with the rise of right-wing leaders emerging in Europe, 
among other international developments, has—whether by coincidence or correlation—happened 
in conjunction with challenged reproductive rights, escalating hostility towards immigrants, and 
a polarization and secularization of religious expression. In contemporary times, as in during the 
first years of its founding, the court occupies a critical space in the global dialogue of women’s 
rights. Staying silent on issues of women’s rights, or even showing lukewarm support, 
conveniently preserves a history of conservative court matters and cooperation with member 
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states’ demands while risking potentially impactful opportunities to represent women during a 
time of key rulings. Should the ECtHR seek to substantially improve their engagement with 
women’s rights, it is apparent that crafting a more diverse and gender-balanced bench should 
arguably be accomplished, as indeed it already has by the International Criminal Court. 
Additionally, the court must be more sensitive to scholarly feedback and women’s aid 
organizations, as well as considering the emerging studies which are beginning to analyze their 
numerous body of cases. With review of external feedback from critics and the development of 
internal mechanisms to officially recognize and reference women’s rights within inclusive case 
recommendations, the ECtHR is much more likely to remain an empowering force for women in 
the decades to come. 
Word count: 7226 
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